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ABSTRACT
The Amgen Rhode Island facility is dedicated to the production of the biological bulk drug
substance (BDS) for Enbrel® (etanercept), which blocks the action of one's immune system,
helping to treat immune diseases, such as rheumatoid arthritis, ankylosing spondylitis, psoriatic
arthritis, and psoriasis. A productivity process improvement is currently being implemented that
will change the manufacturing capacity of the production process at each of the three separately
owned manufacturing facilities for Enbrel® BDS. Given that the Amgen Rhode Island facility
currently only produces Enbrel® BDS, the Rhode Island facility has the largest capacity of all
the BDS manufacturers, and that Enbrel®'s initial patent expires at the end of 2012; product
sourcing is a major concern for both the Rhode Island site and the Enbrel® supply network.
As biopharmaceutical companies shift their focus more toward more efficient production
operations, issues such as diminishing productivity in drug development and the impact of an
emerging follow-on biologics market are becoming critical factors in determining a company's
long-term growth and sourcing strategy. This research examines both the qualitative and
quantitative components that go into strategic sourcing decisions that are made by innovative
biological therapeutic producers. This thesis develops a methodology and framework for
strategic sourcing decisions and guidelines for selecting, implementing, and managing
relationships within a biotechnological manufacturing network of separately owned facilities as
applied to the Enbrel® BDS case study.
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1. Introduction
This thesis explores the issues surrounding strategic sourcing decisions of an aging blockbuster
biologic therapeutic that is produced and distributed through multiple alliances and partnerships
in the biopharmaceutical industry. It is based in part on a six month internship at Amgen Inc.'s
Rhode Island manufacturing facility. The internship focused on building a framework for
Amgen's long-term sourcing needs for a human therapeutic that is reaching what is typically
deemed as the end of a pharmaceutical's product lifecycle, but is faced with the long-term
demand uncertainty surrounding when and how the introduction of follow-on biologics will
impact the product's market.
Further complicating the strategic sourcing decision is that the number and capabilities of
contract manufacturers in the biotechnology sector has now grown to the point that the choice to
be a fully integrated therapeutic development and discovery company must be re-evaluated. The
decision to manufacture in-house, outsource, or both is not to be taken lightly, as the choice will
have a profound impact on how a company manages its long-term assets and manufacturing
relationships. Yet with market wide decreasing pipeline productivity and growing concerns over
the rising costs of healthcare, pharmaceutical and biotech companies are under increasing
pressures to maximize a therapeutic's lifecycle potential, which now incorporates reviewing a
company's strategic manufacturing model to increase productivity and lower costs.
1.1. Thesis Outline
This thesis examines a framework for making strategic sourcing decisions at the end of a
biological therapeutic's life cycle. Given the high barriers of investment and technical
knowledge needed to produce follow-on biologics, biologic innovators are likely to experience
lesser generic competition than current traditional pharmaceuticals do when their product's
original patents expire. This thesis drafts a methodology for framing the answer to the make
versus buy question for an aging biologic in a complex manufacturing network. The structure of
the thesis is as follows:
Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter lays out the structure and basis of the researched work.
Chapter 2: Overview of Amgen, Inc. and Enbrel@
This chapter provides an overview of Amgen, Inc. and a context for building a strategic sourcing
strategy for its product Enbrel® (etanercept), which is co-produced through multiple strategic
alliances.
Chapter 3: Background of the Pharmaceutical Industry
This chapter provides an overview of the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries drug
development process, including the risks and costs of developing therapeutics.
Chapter 4: Background on Generics and Follow-on Biologics
This chapter reviews some of the past generic pharmaceutical hurdles that constitute today's
market. It then contrasts the differences between follow-on biologics and traditional generic
pharmaceuticals, ending with a discussion on how follow-on biologics may impact the
biopharmaceutical industry.
Chapter 5: The Vertical Integration Decision
This chapter outlines the major factors to consider when faced with a make versus buy decision
and applies them to the Enbrel@ case study.
Chapter 6: Modeling Economic Souring Strategies in the Enbrel@ Supply Network
As one of the major factors to consider in the vertical integration framework, an economic
financial model was created and applied to the Enbrel® bulk drug substance supply network to
create a basis to compare costs of different manufacturing facilities.
Chapter 7: Conclusions, Recommendations, and Future Work
This chapter provides a summary of the author's conclusions, recommendations, and proposed
future work.
2. Overview of Amgen, Inc. and Enbrel@
This chapter provides an overview of the human therapeutics company Amgen, Inc. In addition,
it also provides a background for Amgen's novel therapeutic Enbrel®, which will be used as the
case study for the strategic sourcing framework of this thesis.
2.1. Amgen, Inc. Company Background
Amgen is a vertically integrated global company that helped pioneer the development of novel
and innovative therapeutics based on advances in recombinant DNA and molecular biology.
Amgen therapeutics has changed the practice of medicine, helping millions of people in the fight
against cancer, kidney disease, rheumatoid arthritis, and other illnesses. Amgen introduced two
of the first biologically derived human therapeutics, EPOGEN® and NEUPOGEN®, which also
became the biotechnology industry's first blockbusters.'
Founded in 1980 as AMGen (Applied Molecular Genetics), Amgen has grown into the largest
biotechnology company based on yearly revenues. Figure 1 shows the contribution by product
of Amgen's 2007 revenues of $14.3 billion.2
2007 Amgen Revenue s by Product
(in millions of dollars)
OtherProducts, $701
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Figure 1: <Amgen Product Contribution to Annual Revenue in 2007>
Although Amgen has a full and robust pipeline, Amgen's greatest near-term growth potential lies
within their pipeline product denosumab, which is a fully human monoclonal antibody (mAb)
that specifically targets a receptor activator that is a key mediator of the cells responsible for
bone breakdown. Denosumab is being studied across a number of indications, including
osteoporosis, treatment-induced bone loss, rheumatoid arthritis, bone metastases, and multiple
myeloma. 3
2.2. Amgen's Enbrel® Franchise
Tumor necrosis factor (TNF) is a naturally occurring cytokine in the body, which is involved in
triggering the immune system's inflammatory response.4 People with an immune disease, such
as rheumatoid arthritis, ankylosing spondylitis, psoriatic arthritis, and psoriasis, produce too
much TNF in their bodies resulting in the over-stimulus of their immune systems. Enbrel® is a
recombinant human protein that binds to the TNF that one's body makes to block the initiation of
the body's immune system, thereby reducing the amount of active TNF in the body, helping to
treat people with such immune diseases and allow them to lead a normal life.5 The following
figure depicts both the normal inflammatory response of TNF in the body and how Enbrel®'s
mechanism of action can be used to treat immune diseases that result from overproducing TNF
in the body.6
Normal Response Enbrel Mechanism
Figure 2: <Mechanism of Action for Enbrel@ and Other TNF-blockers>
Enbrel® is the current biologic market leader for TNF-blocker therapies, encompassing more
than 39% of the $13.5 billion 2007 world market revenues. A breakdown of the top four
biologic TNF-blocker therapies, as compiled from their respective company financial statements,
is listed in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: <Market Size of TNF-blockers>
Enbrel®'s world market share listed above is larger than Amgen's 2007 reported revenues earlier
in this document, as it is produced in an alliance with Wyeth Pharmaceuticals. Such alliances are
not uncommon in the industry, as the competing TNF-blocker therapy, REMICADE®, is also
produced through an alliance with Johnson and Johnson and the Schering-Plough Corporation.
Other competitors in the biotechnology therapeutics for TNF-blockers include Humira® and
Orencia®, which are produced by Abbott Laboratories and by Bristol-Myers Squibb,
respectively.
Although Enbrel® has grown into a sizeable product franchise, its beginnings were very
troubled. Amgen originally gained access to the Enbrel@ franchise through the acquisition of the
Immunex Corporation at the end of 2001 for $16 billion in stock and cash, 7 at which time there
was a significant waiting list for patients to receive the already FDA approved therapeutic.
Through Amgen's leadership and expertise in manufacturing, it was able to quickly turn around,
start-up, and qualify the struggling Rhode Island facility for production to help meet the ever-
growing demand for the bulk therapeutic. Within a year of finalizing the acquisition, the Rhode
Island site had received production approval from the FDA and Amgen was able offer Enbrel®
to more than 40,000 patients on the waiting list. 8'9 The Amgen Rode Island facility then quickly
moved to eliminate the patient waiting list entirely to ensure that "Every Patient, Every Time"
received their therapeutics, 10 which remains a core manufacturing motto even today.
Hnu r a@, $3,U64
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2.3. The Enbrel@ Manufacturing Network of Plants
Bulk Drug Substance (BDS) is the biotech equivalent to the pharmaceutical industries' active
pharmaceutical ingredient (API), which is the purest manufactured form of the drug or
therapeutic before it is diluted or mixed with other excipients for its final formulation. The
active drug substance in Enbrel® is etanercept.11 Enbrel®'s Bulk Drug Substance is currently
manufactured at three separately owned and operated manufacturing facilities:
- Amgen in Rhode Island, USA
- Wyeth in Grange Castle, Ireland12
- Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals in Biberach, Germany 13
The Enbrel@ alliance with Wyeth and Boehringer Ingelheim was founded before Amgen
acquired Immunex in 2002,14,15 when Wyeth and Immunex were struggling to supply the market
with Enbrel®.16 Under the current relationship with Wyeth, Amgen retains the rights to sell and
manufacture Enbrel@ for the US and Canadian markets, while paying Wyeth a portion of sales in
the form of alliance revenues, and Wyeth retains the rights to the rest of the world market. 17 This
may appear to be an unequal initial split, but such arrangements typically split the total world
market approximately in half. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals (BIP) currently remains a
strategic partner in Amgen's and Wyeth's production planning. 18' 19 Once again, such strategic
alliances are not uncommon in the marketplace, as biopharmaceutical companies depend heavily
on strategic alliances to both discover and produce new products. In 2004, an industry survey
showed that 35% of biologic companies outsourced at least some of their production and
predicted that by 2008 this percentage would increase to 47%.20
2.4. The Enbrel® Process Overview
Amgen is currently demonstrating a process change for Enbrel®. This process enhancement,
using a New Improved System (NIS)' will be referred to as Enbrel® NIS for the remainder of
this thesis for simplicity. There are multiple reasons for this change, the most important of
which is that the process change improves the end production titers, which increases the
i Data disguised to protect confidential information
manufacturing capacity of each batch produced. Biologic productivity metrics in the
biotechnology industry are typically based on titers that are reported on a g/L basis of the final
BDS. Given the fixed capital already dedicated to producing Enbrel@ for the world market, this
process change greatly alters the manufacturing capacity of the entire production network, which
creates excess capacity that needs to be rationalized.2 1
To provide the reader with a better understanding of Enbrel®'s biologic production processes, an
overview of the original formulation process is shown in Figure 4,22 which is similar to Enbrel@
NIS manufacturing process. The process starts with the thawing of a single or multiple vials of
concentrated genetically engineered Chinese Hamster Ovary (CHO) host cells from a working
cell bank to initiate a new cell culture.23 CHO cells are one of the most widely used cell lines,
since they are robust and grow well in cell cultures.24 The working cell bank is compromised of
a fully characterized mammalian cell line that has been genetically engineered to produce the
required protein. This working cell bank is typically stored at temperatures less than -70 0 C to
ensure stability. This working cell bank is also finite in size, so it is very important to ensure that
inventory is tracked properly and use of the working cell bank is optimized. The working cell
bank is produced from a master cell bank, which marks the initiation of the specific characterized
cell line that is maintained for all production processes from preclinical studies to marketed
materials throughout the entire lifecycle for the therapeutic. 25
Figure 4: <Overview of a Bulk Drug Substance Manufacturing Process>
The thawed vial(s) from the working cell bank is then inoculated as a small suspension culture
on the order of a few milliliters and then goes through numerous growth activities to allow the
cells to divide and multiply into a larger, more productive culture suitable for productively
producing the end therapeutic.26 To increase productivity of the vial(s) from the working cell
bank, a working suspension culture can be split and perpetuated several times into stock cultures
that can be used to inoculate multiple larger production batches that are on the order of a few
liters, as shown in Figure 5 below. This process of growing the cells from the initial frozen vial
to a production size reactor in cell culture is time and labor intensive and on the order of weeks
to complete.
InDculum Prep Seed Cultures
- Stack Cult ures CultureCulture
Figure 5: <Overview of Inoculum Preparations for Cell Culture>
After Inoculation and Seed Preparation, single BDS batches are initiated in Cell Culture using
similar techniques as the lab, but on much larger scale. Throughout the production process,
technicians closely monitor numerous parameters, such as microbial growth, microscopic
contamination, endotoxin, cell density, viability, pH, osmolality, CO2, glucose, and lactate. 27
When the cell culture has reached a sufficient size and concentration, process conditions are
changed so that the cell culture begins production the therapeutic protein. The process then goes
through a very extensive purification process that includes a sequence of validated
chromatographic, ultrafiltration, and viral inactivation steps using proprietary equipment and
filtration techniques to isolate the final protein. This protein is then frozen in a buffer solution to
be shipped to another site to complete the Final Fill and Finish operations.28
The total Enbrel® NIS production process from inoculation to final commercial formulation
takes approximately three months for completion and requires intense active monitoring of
process conditions to ensure that cells grow optimally using aseptic processing techniques to
produce a sterile product.29 Biotechnology processes typically are not very flexible, as the
production line is a living cell that requires oxygen and nutrients to survive and grow, and also
requires 24/7 monitoring of the process. They are sensitive processes that are not always as well
understood as other types of production processes, as contaminations from outside sources,
variable growth rates, and the intricate metabolic cell mechanisms involved in producing a
biologic therapeutic make producing a marketable product both challenging and expensive.
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3. Background of the Pharmaceutical Industry
The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries require a high aptitude toward perseverance, as
drug development timelines and success rates are both lengthy and risky, but the rewards for
successfully bringing a new therapeutic to market are both socially and economically high. Yet
before one can understand how an innovative therapeutics company like Amgen can review its
sourcing needs, one must first understand the overall industry's value chain that its therapeutics
operate under and the strict regulatory environment that is associated with its operations.
3.1. The Drug Development Cycle
The pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industry is highly regulated by agencies around the
world such as the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) and the European Medicines Agency
(EMEA). Yet despite the growing concern over health care issues in America, few understand
the grueling process that a New Molecular Entity (NME) or Biologic License Application (BLA)
must undergo to be approved by the FDA. The typical consumer today demands that new novel
therapeutics be released to the public as quickly as possible and carry with it a safety profile that
is similar to daily over-the-counter products he or she is already taking, without understanding
what those demands entail.
Current typical cycle times from the initial discovery of a new therapeutic to an approved
marketed medication can take anywhere from 10 to 15 years.30 Each of these testing phases
must serves a predefined and distinct purpose, and must be sized appropriately to produce
statistically significant results for an investigational new drug a to proceed to the next phase.
The FDA drug development process is outlined in Figure 6, along with typical lengths and
probabilities of success of each phase, which will be discussed further.
Pre-Clinical Clinical Approval Market
IND
Toxicology Phase I
Phase II
Safety I Phase Ill
Safety NDA I
Dosing Safety
Efficacy Efficacy Market / Phase
Side Effects
40% 75% 48% 64% 90%
1 to 5 yrs 5 to 11 yrs 0.5 to 2 yrs 11 to 14 yrs
Figure 6: <Drug Development Life Cycle with Probabilities of Success> 31
In order to submit an Investigational New Drug (IND) application, preclinical testing is done in
at least two animal models to assess initial toxicology and biological activity. After FDA
approval of the IND, Phase I testing can begin in humans. This typically involves testing in 20
to 80 healthy volunteers to determine safety and dosage limits. In Phase II, patient volunteers of
several hundred people create the basis to evaluate the drug's effectiveness and further study
safety and dosing effects. Often Phase II studies will also have a control arm to the clinical trial
response to establish proof of concept. In the last trial phase prior to FDA approval, a Phase III
study typically has sample sizes of hundreds to thousands of patient volunteers to verify
effectiveness and monitor reactions from long-term use. At least two Phase III placebo
controlled double blind trials are required before submitting a New Drug Application (NDA) for
marketing approval.32
After a new therapeutic is approved, a company will often complete additional Phase III and
Phase IV studies to gain new indications or to compile comparison studies against its
competitors. Results for additional studies are not always positive though, as a post marketing
study by Merck & Co. provided the first conclusive data of a higher incident of heart attacks and
strokes during long-term, high dosage use of its arthritis medication Vioxx®.33 The results of
this study led to the voluntary withdrawal of a drug that had grossed 2.5 billion dollars in
revenues in the year prior and created a huge litigation liability that was eventually settled
through a 4.85 billion dollar settlement.34
3.2. Risks and Costs of Innovation
The challenge of discovering a new novel therapeutic is not only the time it takes to navigate the
clinical review process, but also the probability associated with achieving successful approval at
each phase of clinical development. To produce ten candidates for Phase I clinical trials in
humans requires as many as 40,000 compounds to be screened during pre-clinical studies. Of
those ten therapeutic candidates that are initially tested in humans, only one will be eventually
approved by the FDA.3 5 To put this in better perspective, as of April of this year, there were
more than 54,000 clinical trials being conducted in more than 154 countries registered on
ClinicalTrials.gov, which is provided as a service of the U.S. National Institute of Health.36 As a
result, even if a company has a robust early promising pipeline, its pipeline can drastically
change over a five year time span, making long-term therapeutic planning a difficult task.
As a result, a growing issue in drug development focuses on the increasing costs of developing
and innovating new medicines. Given the expected duration and probabilities associated with
achieving a single successful approval, the total capitalized development cost for a biologic
therapeutic is now estimated by DiMasi and Grabowski to be as high as $1.24 billion per
biopharmaceutical approval, as compared to the estimated cost of $1.32 billion per
pharmaceutical approval.37 The similarities in the order of magnitude between development
costs for pharmaceuticals and biologics can be attributed to biologics realizing higher
probabilities of clinical success (30% versus 21.5% for new drugs), but also have longer mean
clinical development times (98 months versus 90 months).3 8
To highlight the growing productivity problems surrounding the discovery of new novel
medications, the capitalized cost estimate in 2000 was between 450 and 700 million dollars per
pharmaceutical approval.39 Additional funding from pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies has not drastically increased output either. As shown in Figure 7, the cost to develop
new novel medications is growing at a nearly exponential rate, yet the approval of new drugs is
not keeping pace. This trend only shows signs of continuing, as in 2007, the FDA only approved
17 new molecular entities and two biologic license applications, the lowest number of approvals
since 1983.40
Total R&D investment (US$ billion) NMEs
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Figure 7: <Productivity of Drug Development in the United States>41
However, just because a drug makes it near the end of the approval process does not ensure that
it will make it to market, nor does it ensure that the product will be able to be successfully
marketed. Pfizer recently wrote-off one billion dollars attributed to a single therapeutic when its
highly touted HDL raising drug torcetrapib was dealt a late stage Phase III trial failure due to
increased blood pressure concerns. Furthermore, among drugs that successfully make it to
market, only about three in ten produce returns that exceed their development costs. 42
Furthermore, as costs increasingly dominate a therapeutic company's decisions, drugs may now
be pulled even when they are safe and effective, but just not economically profitable. Pfizer took
another 2.8 billion dollar write-off for Exubera®, an inhaled insulin product, for which the
product franchise simply was not returning enough money to justify its costs of continued
marketing and production.43
Amgen too has experienced recent disappointments from negative clinical trial findings, as
clinical data in 2007 revealed that its anemia product Aranesp® showed a higher incidence of
fatal side effects when dosed at levels outside the approved label claims, especially when used in
cancer patients.44 The FDA responded by enforcing stricter label claims, including its strictest
black box warning to Amgen's anemia drugs. Medicare and Medicaid also responded by greatly
limiting the reimbursement policies concerning anemia medications, as they paid more than 90%
of all dialysis treatment in the United States in 2005, which represented approximately 2 billion
dollars in anemia drug related costs. 45
Since the Aranesp® franchise makes up approximately a quarter of Amgen's revenues, the entire
company felt the effect of dropping sales, perhaps none harder than the Rhode Island facility.
Amgen was faced with needing to drastically cut costs and announced that it was cutting 12-14%
of its workforce, Amgen's first layoff in its history. In addition, Amgen was reducing capital
expenses by $1.9 billion over two years,46 which included the canceling of a potential project to
retrofit the older of two manufacturing factories at the Rhode Island site. As a result of these
events, coupled with the upcoming Enbrel@ NIS productivity improvement process, the Amgen
Rhode Island site was faced with having to shut down one of its two production factories and
laying off 300 of its then 1,600 employees. 47
However, Amgen was not the only company that struggled in 2007 due to struggling pipeline
productivity, as companies such as Novartis, Merck, Pfizer, Eli Lily, Bristol Myers Squibb, Astra
Zeneca, Johnson & Johnson, and Bayer all suffered through downsizing last year. In fact, as
shown in Table 1, more employees in the pharmaceutical and biotech sector were laid off by
their companies than ever before. Never have the difficulties of drug development process been
more evident, as waning R&D productivity, increased competition, and increased safety
regulations have forced numerous layoffs and plant closures across the industry.
Announced Job Cuts in the
Pharmaceutical and
Bio echnology Industry
2007 31,178
2006 15,638
2005 26,300
2004 15,640
2003 28,519
2002 11,488
2001 4,736
2000 2,453
Table 1: <Announced Job Cuts in the Pharmaceutical Industry by Year>48
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4. Background on Generics and Follow-on Biologics
The introduction of follow-on biologics to the biopharmaceutical market is not a new concept, as
traditional generic pharmaceuticals faced many of the same arguments that follow-on biologics
are facing today. Although there are very distinct differences between pharmaceutical generics
and follow-on biologics, this chapter will begin with a review of past generic advances before
looking at the present legislation needs and its impact to the biopharmaceutical industry.
4.1. History of Generic Pharmaceuticals
Prior to 1962, the introduction of generic pharmaceuticals to the market could be achieved by
simply submitting a paper new drug application that stated a generic manufacturer had
completed a safety review of published papers of the original branded drug. In the early 1960s
though, a sedative and treatment for morning sickness in pregnant women called Thalidomide
was found to be associated with thousands of birth defects throughout Europe. Although the
drug had not yet been approved in the United States, the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendment to
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was enacted in response to the Thalidomide tragedy. This
amendment provided that all new drug approvals required studies to ensure the drug's safety and
provide proof of efficacy. 49 Although this was important legislation for its time, it subsequently
halted generic production of drugs, as generic drugs were subjected to the same approval
requirements as original innovative drugs. As a result, generic manufacturers typically did not
spend the money to complete the clinical trials required to achieve the safety and proof of
efficacy requirement to get to market.
It was not until 1984 that the Hatch-Waxman Act, which was started as a patent term restoration
bill for pharmaceuticals, provided an easier pathway for generic production and marketing by
requiring that bioavailability studies be completed via an abbreviated new drug application. This
legislation was primarily based on the assumption that generic reproductions of the original
innovative drug product were the same, which could be tested by comparing blood serum levels
in the body. That is the level of generic active ingredient in the blood over a period of time must
come within +/- 20% of that of the original branded drug for the same time period. This
bioavailability test was the means of testing the safety and efficacy of the generic against the
original innovator's product and allows generic manufacturers to submit an abbreviated
application to the FDA without having to complete full clinical trials. As a result of this
legislation, generics gained a clear pathway that could allow them to begin competing in the
open market place the day after an innovator's patent protection expired.
The Hatch-Waxman Act provided additional protections for drug innovator as well. Under this
legislation, product development companies receive at least five years exclusivity for new
molecular entities prior to generic competition, even if the NME's patent expires in that time
frame, based on the complicated drug development process required by the FDA. The length of
exclusivity is a very important feature for drug innovators, as it provides nearly absolute market
protection from generics, as patent claim infringements suits might not hold up in court and are
an added expense to the drug development cycle. Such concessions were necessary to make the
change beneficial to both innovators and generic producers.5 o
4.2. Differences Between the Pharmaceuticals and Biopharmaceuticals
A biologic drug substance is an agent that is synthesized from living organisms or their products
and used as a diagnostic, preventive, or therapeutic agent. 51 Biologics are typically large
complex proteins with intricate appended sugar groups. When compared to the "traditional"
small molecule, a biopharmaceutical can be up to 100 to 1,000 times larger in size, 52 making the
characterization of the final therapeutic's bioequivalence a complicated task that may even be
beyond the sensitivities of current analytical methods. To highlight the inherent differences in
their structural complexity, Table 2 was constructed to show a direct comparison of the Enbrel®
biologic to Merck's synthetic small molecule antibiotic Invanz®.
Marketed Name Enbrel® Invanz®
Generic Name Etanercept Ertapenem Sodium
Molecular Formula C2224 H3475 N621 0698 S36 C22 H25 N3 07 S
Molecular Mass 51,234.9 g/mol 475.5 g/mol
Therapeutic
Structure "-' o II-i t .
(Not to scale) i
Table 2: <Enbrel@ Biologic Therapeutic Comparison to a Small Molecule Antibiotic>53'54
Where manufacturing processes are concerned, most traditional pharmaceuticals use chemical
synthesis processes to produce a stable active pharmaceutical ingredient, which often includes
having well-defined, stable intermediates that can be used for quantifying in-process quality
control and step yields. When compared to a small molecule, a biopharmaceutical uses
genetically engineered living cells in a very sensitive culture medium to directly produce an
unstable end therapeutic. Even under the most stringent processing conditions, proteins can
exhibit a high degree of heterogeneity, based on glycolsylation or in protein folding
differences. 55 Furthermore, reliable analytical results for the use of in-process quality control
and yield tracking are rare, as most analytical methods for testing of biopharmaceuticals are time
intensive and provide fairly variable results. Finally, although separating and purifying small
molecule intermediates and API's are not academic processes, the extraction and purification of
complex proteins without altering their biological activity or clinical properties typically requires
significantly more sophistication.
Given the many challenges in consistently producing a biologic, regulatory approval for the
marketing of a new biologic is actually given both for the therapeutic product and the
manufacturing site(s) where it is produced.56 Original approval covers the formulation of the
master cell bank that a therapeutic is produced from, since the production of the therapeutic
relies so heavily on the intricate understanding and genetic manipulation of the host cell's
internal metabolic pathways. Similar to the due diligence needed for the original approval, the
regulatory requirements for post-approval changes are also very strict. Many manufacturing
processes in the biotech sector undergo limited process changes once the process is initially
successfully demonstrated, since even small changes to the process can result in unforeseen
safety concerns, quality issues, and cost overlays.
In terms of patient safety, another important difference between classic pharmaceuticals and
biopharmaceuticals concerns patient immunogenic response to these products. Nearly all protein
based drug products induce an immunogenic response, which leads to the production of
antibodies in the patient's body. Immunogenicity can have major clinical consequences and
affect the potency and efficacy of the therapeutic administered, especially when it is directly
injected into the patient. Beyond the structural factors controlled by the choice of host cell such
as protein sequence and glycolsylation, immunogenicity can also be influenced by other factors,
including process-related impurities, formulation, dose and length of treatment, and many other
unknown factors. 57 Despite improving analytics, there is no international analytical standard that
has consistently been proven to compare the immunogenic response of two differently
manufactured biologics without the introduction of clinical trials.58
The last distinction between classic pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals is the debate
surrounding what a generic is, as even the term generic sparks great controversy within the
biotech industry. Terms such as biogenerics, biosimilars, biocomparables, and follow-on
biologics are all current terms used to describe the biotech counterpart to the traditional generic
drug, which all suggest connotations or preconceptions that can be used to support one's asserted
position.59 As such, biotech firms typically refer to biogenerics as follow-on biologics or
biosimilars to further emphasize that the produced entity may not be identical to the innovator's
original therapeutic. Biogeneric manufacturers, on the other hand, argue for the terms such as
biogeneric or biocomparable.
There is more than just a name at stake here, as the final classification(s) will likely shape the
ongoing legislation discussed in the next section. However, it is not the author's intent to argue
for or against the proper or correct classification required here, especially since the scientific
community has not completely agreed to terms. As such, the author will refer to generic
biopharmaceuticals as follow-on biologics for the rest of this paper, since it has the smallest
preconceptions in the author's opinion.
4.3. Follow On-Biologics: Future Regulatory Hurdles and Economic Impact
Although the Hatch-Waxman Act provided a pathway for generic drug market entry by
amending the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, it does not generally apply to biologics, as they are
governed under the Public Health Service Act, which does not have an equivalent abbreviated
application process for approval of follow-on biologics." As a result, follow-on biologics have
recently faced increased legislative scrutiny in Congress and the press, yet the timing of their
introduction has still not been clarified in the United States. The following sections will delve
further into the issues surrounding creating a regulatory pathway for follow-on biologics and
what their short and long-term impact might be for the industry.
4.3.1. Follow On-Biologics: Future Regulatory Hurdles
Despite the hurdles a company must undergo just to bring a new novel therapeutic to market, the
regulatory approval surrounding follow-on biologics has been notably even more complicated.
The EMEA has pioneered legislation for the approval of biosimilars in Europe (biosimilars being
EMEA's preferred term for follow-on biologics), but the United States has yet to agree on
legislation that would define an approval pathway for the FDA to approve follow-on biologics.
Beyond the sensitive production issues highlighted in the previous section of this thesis,
immense debate has surrounded the legislative requirements for the length of marketing
exclusivity that should be guaranteed to innovators, the extent to which clinical trials will be
required to ensure comparability, and what constitutes an interchangeable follow-on biologic.
Exclusivity. Perhaps the greatest economic driver to the stalling U.S. legislation is based on
how long an innovator should be guaranteed exclusivity rights. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act,
innovators of a new drug are guaranteed at least five years of exclusivity after approval. Orphan
drugs, which receive additional regulatory incentives to treat rare, life threatening diseases that
serve fewer than 200,000 Americans,6 1 only receive seven years of marketing exclusivity. Yet
under the current Kennedy-Clinton-Hatch-Enzi bill in Congress for follow-on biologics,
therapeutic innovators would be guaranteed at least twelve years of exclusivity, even if their
original patent protection expires during that timeframe.62 This is currently considered as a
political compromise, since biotech advocates are pushing for 14 years to receive an adequate
return on their investment, whereas generic manufacturers believe that 7-10 years is far more
reasonable time period to allow consumers access to competitive medications.
It should be noted that drug patent protection last for 20 years, but this protection typically
includes the time spent navigating the drug development cycle for market approval, so such a
legislative concession could significantly extend exclusivity rights and revenues of the innovator
of a blockbuster therapeutic. As noted earlier, biologics do require slightly longer review periods
on average (eight months), but their overall capitalized costs are still similar to that of traditional
pharmaceuticals based on a higher clinical trial success rate. In the opinion of the author, given
the similar capital costs of bringing a therapeutic to market, the granting of the excessively long
exclusivity period that biotech companies are looking for will likely not be achieved, but will be
successful in continuing to delay a legislative compromise until the presidential election.
Comparability. Based on today's analytic technology, determining whether a follow-on
biologic is comparable to the innovator's therapeutic is a difficult task. Given that small changes
to the original biologic can cause severe immunogenic responses in patients, the use of a
bioavailability study similar to generic pharmaceuticals to approve follow-on biologics is
inadequate. As a result, many current biotech companies are pushing for complete clinical trials
for follow-on biologics to ensure patient safety and therapeutic comparability, but opponents
view this as lobbying for an additional barrier to entry for follow-on manufacturers.
Yet even process changes to currently licensed therapeutics do not require such levels of
supporting data. For example, the Enbrel® NIS productivity improvement is a process change.
Although it was a regulatory requirement, Amgen completed additional Phase III clinical trials of
up to 224 patients to ensure that Enbrel@ NIS created the proper antibodies and avoided any
serious adverse events. 63' 64 Given that the FDA already approves process changes by this
manner, it would seem that follow-on biologics should be afforded at least the same minimum
requirement, although they might need more complexity to their trials based on having more
major process changes, such as having a new genetically master cell bank, manufacturing
processes, etc.. Based on this and other arguments, the current legislative compromise in
Congress is to grant the FDA the right to determine what level, if any, of clinical trials are
required for follow-on biologic approval.
Interchangeability. Although proving comparability might grant a follow-on biologic
marketing approval, product interchangeability is just as crucial an economic requirement.
Without specifically assessing the interchangeability of follow-on biologics, ensuring consumer
confidence in an approved follow-on biologic to maintain the standard of care for all patients
cannot be guaranteed.65 This will raise significant challenges for government agencies and
insurance providers when a follow-on-biologic enters the market. The typical response would be
to move patients to the cheaper alternative, but many doctors might be resistant to this change
initially, especially if even a single patient responds negatively to a follow-on biologic
therapeutic after receiving successful treatment before. As a current example, despite Enbrel®
being a market leader in TNF-blockers therapies, not all patients respond favorably to its
administration, yet might respond favorably to a competitor's TNF-blocker. Similar experiences
are bound to occur for follow-on biologics, too.
Given the current deadlock in Congress, approved legislation for follow-on biologics is likely not
to occur until the next president is determined. Even then, the FDA will require additional time
to adapt once this new legislation is passed, making an executable pathway for follow-on
biologics in the United States close to two years away. In the meantime, the EMEA is already
approving biosimilars in Europe, including at least three biosimiliar products for Epogen®.
Regardless, the EMEA's pioneering of such legislation will provide the foundation to what
finally is determined in the United States, depending on what successes or failures result from it
being the biosimiliar leader.
4.3.2. Follow On-Biologics: Potential Economic Impact
Because of the innovations afforded by the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic pharmaceutical
producers can easily position themselves to enter the market the day an innovator's patent
protection ends. For traditional drug therapeutics today, it is not uncommon for the innovator to
lose up to 90% of its market in the days following patent expiration, as portrayed in Figure 8.66
It is based on this fact that many people believe that once a regulatory pathway is approved for
follow-on biologics it will immediately impact the current biologic market, given the large
incentives to capture part of today's 40.3 billion dollar biologic market that is expected to grow
to 60 billion dollars by the year 2010.67,68
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Figure 8: <Typical Drug Price Erosion with Numerous Generic Producers>
Historical Analysis. The current market response to patent expiry of traditional pharmaceuticals
was not always the case though, as interchangeability of traditional drug therapies was as similar
a public concern after the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in 1984 as it is today for follow-on
biologics. An analysis of 35 molecular drugs, which lost their patent protection between the
years 1984-1987, found that revenues of those products declined only 17%, while unit sales
declined 32% in the three years after their original patent expiration. 69 So although the
introduction of follow-on biologics may significantly alter the long-term equilibrium market
share for a particular therapeutic, the speed in which the market reaches that equilibrium will
likely change very slowly as consumer confidence builds, particularly since most biologics are
injectable products, instead of the typical pill formulation of traditional pharmaceuticals.
Financial Barriers. Another reason that follow-on biologics will not have as large an impact as
traditional generics is that follow-on biologics will have much higher investment needs than
traditional generic manufacturers, which will act as a significant barrier to entry for many
companies. Substantial investments in research and development will be required to genetically
engineer and validate a master cell bank for each follow-on biologic. Manufacturing facilities
for biologics are also more costly than tradition pharmaceuticals, since they are constructed to
ensure the sterility of the product throughout the manufacturing process.
Furthermore, the level to which clinical trials are utilized will significantly add additional risks
and costs not typically taken on by traditional generic manufacturers. Using the European
approvals as a benchmark, even small Phase III clinical trials for a few hundred patients can cost
10-40 million dollars, as compared to the one to two million dollars to demonstrate
bioequivalence for traditional generic drugs.70 Given the increased risk and investment costs of
producing biologics, the number of manufacturers willing and capable to produce follow-on
biologics is likely to be appreciably less than that faced by traditional pharmaceuticals today.
Follow-on Biologics Market Projection. As a result of the initial limited consumer confidence
in follow-on biologics and the higher barrier to entry for generic biologic manufacturers to enter
the market, it is likely that there will be fewer players in the follow-on biologic market once a
pathway in the United States is approved. With fewer generic manufacturers entering the
market, the rate and depth of penetration of the market is likely to be greatly diminished when
compared to traditional generic pharmaceuticals. It has been shown for traditional
pharmaceuticals that generic prices only differ from their branded counterparts when there are a
significant number of competitors in the market.71 Therefore, the resulting market share erosion
of generic biologic market is likely to be closer to that seen in Figure 9,72 since with fewer
competitors in the market, price competition will not likely be as fierce as with traditional
pharmaceuticals, especially with additional investments needed to enter the market.
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Figure 9: <Potential Drug Price Erosion with Limited Generic Producers>
The economy of this type of market leaves a significant margin for all producers in the short-run.
This assumes the number of generic competitors that enter the market remains low enough not to
trigger marginal cost pricing, which seems a sensible assumption, as there currently does not
exist a sufficient number of generic biologic competitors capable of entering the U.S. market to
do so. In the long-run, more competitors will likely slowly join the market as interchangeability,
technology, and manufacturing barriers are lowered, but this shift to a new market equilibrium is
likely to occur gradually over a significant number of years.
On the other hand, biologic therapeutics that serve orphan drug markets will also likely enjoy
sustained long-run pricing and market share for similar reasons. An orphan drug designation is
given to therapies that treat rare life threatening diseases that serve fewer than 200,000
Americans, 73 so this smaller market size should provide significant advantages for branded
drugs, as there is not enough market potential for several competitors to exist. This is important
since nearly half of all the new significant biological approvals granted by the FDA between
1994 and 2001 have been orphan drugs. 74 In this case, not only will there be a limited number of
competitors to enter an orphan biologic market because of the high barriers to entry, but by
definition, there will also be a limited number of patients to sustain competition between those
competitors.
I :
I
Based on the analysis presented here, it is the opinion of the author that a product such as
Enbrel@ can potentially enjoy another decade of favorable market conditions, before long-term
price erosion is experienced from follow-on biologic producers. It is possible then that even with
it large therapeutic market size of 13.5 billion dollars, it might only lose 10-30% of its unit sales
market share to follow-on biologic producers even three to five years after it has lost patent
protection, as interchangeability concerns are of even greater importance for biologics then
traditional generics. In fact, given this long of a time-horizon, Enbrel® is more likely to lose
significant unit market share based on the entrance of a newer, novel therapeutic than to the
emergence of follow-on biologics.
At this point, the long-term strategic decision based on whether to outsource a biologic that is
about to lose patent protection requires evaluation by standards that are significantly different
than that used for the current traditional pharmaceutical model. The following chapter will
discuss the major decision factors that one should consider when making this strategic sourcing
decision.
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5. The Vertical Integration Decision
The decision to vertically integrate versus vertically dis-integrate, make versus buy, in source
versus outsource are all derivatives of the same difficult, complex question: How much of the
value chain should a company own and under what conditions should it change its position?75
Especially in today's fast paced biotechnological environment, where pipeline uncertainties and
the entrance of follow-on biologics is forthcoming, a company must be prepared to make and
revisit this decision regularly, without significantly disrupting its long-term operations as a
whole. As described by Beckman and Rosenfield in Operations Strategy: Competing in the 21st
Century, there are four factors that go into the end decision; strategic, market, operational, and
economic factors. 76 This chapter will discuss these major factors as they apply to the Enbrel®
case study.
5.1. Strategic Factors
The strategic issues that drive the vertical integration question are founded upon what core
capabilities a company possesses. These are the sets of skills, activities, and systems a company
performs better than any other enterprise that provides a strategic advantage over others. It is a
critical factor in determining the answer to the vertical integration question, in that a company
can cripple its long-term operations and viability if it were to outsource a core competency, or
more importantly, a critical section inherent to the overall value chain. The level to which a
company decides to outsource must also be consistent with the overall mission of its business
operations and be capable of easily integrating with surrounding sections of the value chain.
5.1.1. Amgen's Core Competencies
When one is dealing with a large vertically integrated biotech company like Amgen, determining
its core competencies is not a straightforward task. Any innovative drug or therapeutic company
needs to have a core competency in research and development to discover new therapies required
to sustain and drive business growth. But limiting the scope to just a single competency could
deemphasize others areas of the value chain that Amgen holds a significant competitive
advantage in, and lead to vertical integration decisions that are detrimental to their long-term
success. As a result, this thesis looks for Amgen's core competencies through how they
communicate and operate today, as such a reverse engineering approach may provide more
insight. Based on their corporate home page, their mission and values are described as follows:
Figure 10: <Amgen's Corporate Mission>77
Amgen's mission reveals its underlying strategic business driver to serve patients, but does not
communicate how it tactically approaches achieving this mission. Further research into its
corporate website uncovers two distinctly separate fact sheets. The first reveals that "Amgen
discovers, develops and delivers innovative human therapeutics" 78 and focuses on its strengths
as a drug product innovator of new human therapeutics, which is the core competency we
assumed already existed. The second fact sheet, however, is specifically dedicated to
highlighting Amgen's manufacturing capabilities, which produce vital therapies in sufficient
quantities as an important way to serve patients.79 Based on how Amgen communicates its own
strengths then, one would believe that its core competencies go beyond product development of
human therapeutics, but also includes biologic manufacturing capabilities. Amgen's history
relating to ensuring Enbrel@ supply to waiting patients certainly supports the inclusion of this
second core competency.
If then Amgen's core capabilities lie in both innovating and manufacturing human therapeutics,
as this thesis suggests, decisions relating to the outsourcing of all or even part of these sections of
the value chain should be met with caution. Given the sensitivities and complexities of
manufacturing biologics provided earlier, having both capabilities as a developed core
competency provides Amgen with a significant competitive advantage in not only developing
new therapeutics, but also delivering them to the end consumer, the patient.
Amgen strives to serve patients by transforming the promise of
science and biotechnology into therapies that have the power to
restore health or even save lives. in everything we do, we aim to
fulfill our mission to serve patients. And every step of the way, we
are guided by the values that define us.
Our Mission: To Serve Patients
5.1.2. The Role of Contract Manufacturers
Although contract manufacturing organizations (CMOs) in biotechnology are still a maturing
market, there are a growing number of CMOs capable of producing safe and effective biologics.
By 2010, Frost & Sullivan estimate that biopharmaceutical contract manufacturing will be a 9.2
billion dollar market.80 These companies provide product development companies, such as
Amgen, access to both manufacturing capabilities and capacity that would otherwise require
significant time and investment to achieve. As seen earlier, Amgen and Wyeth currently use the
contract manufacturer Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals (BIP) to help manufacture
Enbrel®, a relationship that both companies have fostered over numerous years. 81', 82 ,83,84, 85
These alliances have promoted best practice sharing, stabilized market capacity, developed a
broader supply base, and minimized the risk of supply interruptions.
From a strategic standpoint though, the business goals of a contract manufacturer are definitely
differently aligned than that of a product development company such as Amgen or Wyeth.
Given CMOs place in the value chain, their focus is placed solely on production, which is tied to
maximizing their capacity utilization and providing low cost manufacturing. When considering
the strategic issues around an outsourcing decision, one must be cognizant that an outsourcing
partner is driven by a different set of business drivers than one's own company and plan
accordingly based on it. For example, since a CMO aims to constantly fill its manufacturing
capacity, it will be driven by production quotas that might not be supported by therapeutic
product demand. Therefore, when entering an alliance with a CMO, one must be sure to take
into account future market growth to ensure that the market is continually supplied should
demand unexpectedly increase or decrease. Table 3 lists some additional key business driver
differences between a product innovator company and its CMO counterpart.
Value Proposition
Customers
Value Chain
Elements
Profit Basis
Strategic Mission
Manufacturing
Structure
Product Development Company
Innovative therapies for patients
Insurance companies,
governments, and patients
Vertically integrated from discovery
to marketed commercial product
Based on unit product sold
COGM -15% of revenue
Supply novel medicines to
"Every Patient, Every Time"
Allows for buffer capacity
Contract Manufacturing
Organization
Process optimization and
manufacturing capacity
Product development companies
Focus solely on process development
and manufacturing capacity
Based on unit product produced
COGM -85% of revenue
Supply a low cost
manufacturing capacity
Aim for 100%
utilization of capacity
Table 3: <Typical Business Drivers of Product Development Companies and CMOs>86
Since Amgen is a vertically integrated company, the coordination of the differing competencies
of drug development and manufacturing of its internal value chain poses a substantial challenge.
Although the author found that the manufacturing mission of "Every Patient, Every Time"
resonates with people at manufacturing sites, there is also a heavy focus on production run-rates
and fulfilling a higher percentage of their capacity to better lower their overall costs. From this
perspective, Amgen's own manufacturing division sometimes operates similar to that of a CMO,
creating a divergence of corporate strategic goals. A primary reason for this behavior is the
strong financial drivers at Amgen manufacturing sites to continually lower their costs, which can
be accomplished through achieving better economies of scale through capacity utilization. So
even though Amgen chooses to have vertically integrated manufacturing capabilities, it is
continually challenged by keeping all corporate functions aligned to its overall strategic
corporate mission.
From a strategic standpoint, the important objective to be achieved in a final vertical integration
decision is that the resulting structure ensures smooth handoffs and transitions across the full
product value chain. To maximize a company's operational and business potential, it is
strategically advantageous for them to focus only on those activities that are internal core
competencies, while allowing outside firms to add value through completing non-core activities
in the value chain. This certainly can be a difficult task depending on what level of vertical
integration is applied across the value chain, but there are great competitive advantages to being
able to fully leverage and coordinate capabilities throughout different sections of the value chain.
For example, Amgen's core competency in biologic manufacturing enabled it to quickly qualify
the Rhode Island facility to supply Enbrel@ to waiting patients, while also protecting market
share from its competitors.
Although Amgen has a core competency in biologic manufacturing, this is not to suggest that
they should never create an alliance with a CMO. In fact, the author believes that CMOs can be
strategically leveraged by a product development company to mitigate numerous technology,
capital investment, and capacity risks when used in conjunction with their own manufacturing
capabilities, even when an innovator retains a core competency in manufacturing. What the
strategic factor of the vertical integration decision reveals to us is that the manufacturing function
should not be totally outsourced when it is truly a core competency. As will be discussed in the
following sections, retaining core capabilities in-house will only strengthen a company's position
in its decision to be vertically integrated, when the other major factors are taken into account.
5.2. Market Factors
Beyond strategic factors, a strong understanding of the market landscape and dynamics of the
industry also play a critical role in determining an answer to the vertical integration question. A
general background of the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industry has already been
provided in this thesis, which includes considerations for how follow-on biologics might impact
the market for brand-name biologics. This section will investigate four key market factors that
impact the vertical integration decision, including market reliability, economies of scale, market
power, and asset specificity and dependency risk of capital.
5.2.1. Market Reliability
Market reliability was a key factor in determining why Amgen originally developed into a
vertically integrated biopharmaceutical company, as at the time of its inception there was a lack
of CMOs that possessed the manufacturing knowledge, capacity, or reliable manufacturing
process technology that could support Amgen's needs. In the early 1980s and 1990s, Amgen
was a biotechnology pioneer that was developing its first human therapeutics, so reliable contract
manufacturers that could sufficiently supply the quality, cost, and capacity needs Amgen
required did not yet exist. Amgen's need to be able to properly control these factors in a highly
regulated environment required that it integrate and build such manufacturing capabilities in-
house. Today's landscape has greatly changed though, as new, qualified CMOs have and are
continuing to build successful manufacturing capabilities and capacity within the
biotechnological value chain, which forces Amgen to continually review its current vertical
integration model based on the changing dynamics of the industry.
However, there are still inherent risks to consider in how to control the reliability performance of
a CMO when engaging in an outsourcing strategy. For example, a manufacturer that receives a
negative inspection from the FDA and/or EMEA can potentially disrupt the supply of numerous
drugs and therapies across the world until the quality issues are resolved, especially when there is
a limited amount of supplier capacity. The Chiron Corporation, one of two manufacturers of the
flu vaccine for the American market, did just this when it created a severe shortfall of flu
vaccines in 2004, when a small number of batch contaminations led to the shutdown of one of its
production facilities.8 7 At least when a quality issue is in-house, a product development
company can directly address the issue, instead of trying to work through a CMO to resolve the
problem.
This type of example is a key reason why numerous large pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
companies choose to vertically integrate their manufacturing operations even when it might not
be considered one of their core competencies, which is namely to gain and ensure complete
control of quality issues that might affect their products. Baxter International is currently facing
a critical quality control issue because its Chinese contract manufacturer might be producing
contaminated heparin, after the FDA has reported that up to 19 deaths have resulted from an
allergic reaction from heparin based products.8 8 Heparin is used as a blood thinner to prevent
blood clots. The root cause of the "heparin-like" molecular contamination is unknown at the
time of this writing and it is even uncertain that Baxter's heparin is responsible for all the
reported deaths. However, Baxter is at a severe disadvantage to investigate the issue, since it
does not have direct access to the portion of the value chain that might be directly contributing to
the contamination.
In the case of Enbrel® production, both Amgen and Wyeth can rely on the other members within
the supply network to ensure continued world supply of product to patients should a quality
concern arise at any one of the sites. From this standpoint, the supply network is adequately
designed to reliably ensure Amgen's strategic goal of "Every Patient, Every Time." As a result,
one must evaluate the level of risk associated with any potential changes to the current strategic
sourcing model to ensure the appropriate level of market reliability.
5.2.2. Economies of Scale
The second market factor in answering the vertical integration decision deals with being able to
achieve a higher economy of scale. A biopharmaceutical contract manufacturer might have the
ability to achieve higher economies of scale by producing multiple products for different
customers, thereby achieving higher utilization rates of equipment, and by constructing larger
bioreactors that are capable of higher per batch product productivity. By decreasing the unit cost
of production through higher and more efficient production volumes, a CMO can more
competitively produce therapeutics than a single product development company could through
sourcing each of its products at a separate facility. This is one of the primary competitive
advantages CMOs have, as they can spread their capital and production risks over numerous
different products, whereas product development companies often sole source their in-house
manufacturing operations based on their pipeline availability.
The case of the Enbrel® supply chain network is fairly unique in this matter, as the large
blockbuster unit sales require the therapeutic to be produced on a metric-ton scale, which is
much larger than typical protein therapeutics. 89 Within the current Enbrel@ manufacturing
network, the largest capacity facility is actually found at Amgen's Rhode Island facility. In order
to meet the growing demand back in 2002, Amgen invested more than $1.1 billion dollars to
expand and upgrade the Rhode Island site with nine dedicated 20,000 L bioreactors, the largest
commercial capacity reactors of their time.90 ,91' 92 As a comparison of ARI's superior production
capacity within the Enbrel® supply network, BIP utilizes twelve 15,000 L bioreactors at its
G104 Biberach facility and Wyeth uses six 15,000 L bioreactors at its Grange Castle facility.93' 94
BIP has similar final bulk capacity to ARI (180,000 L), but it is reasonable to assume that BIP
loses production time during process changeovers and cleanouts while making different
therapeutics, whereas the ARI facility is dedicated to Enbrel® production. As a result, Amgen
has the potential for the greatest economies of scale of the players within the Enbrel® supply
network, as they also hold the largest specific production capacity for the therapeutic.
Even with this enormous supply network, the manufacturing capacity of the entire Enbrel®
network was still needed before the recent Enbrel@ NIS productivity improvement began
implementation to ensure that global demand was satisfied.95 The initial difficulty of keeping up
with market demand lead to the construction of manufacturing facilities by both Amgen and
Wyeth that were significantly larger than what was available from CMOs, which in turn placed
the economies of scaled production in their favor. With the new process altering the production
capacity of all plants in the network, steps to re-rationalize the capacity of the supply network is
needed.96
5.2.3. Market Power
Market power is another important factor in determining if a company should vertically
integrate. Enbrel®'s original innovator, the Immunex Corporation, was a small growing
biopharmaceutical firm that was struggling to bring a blockbuster therapeutic to market. As a
much smaller entity in the marketplace at the time, Immunex made significant concessions to
partner with Wyeth and BIP in order to attempt to bring Enbrel@ to the market. In contrast,
today Amgen has grown into the largest biopharmaceutical company by revenues, and therefore,
holds significant market power as a vertically integrated player in the market. Although the
manufacturing alliance still exists today, Amgen's and Wyeth's market power should allow for
increased flexibility and favorability in the contract negotiations for Enbrel® production.
Even though biotech contract manufacturing capabilities have grown considerably, a product
development company might not choose to depend on a sole source supplier based on market
power considerations. Such an action could potentially cause a product innovator to rely too
heavily on a CMO, making a product development company entirely dependent on the supplier
or creating undue market reliability concerns cited previously. To avoid such an outsourcing
trap, a product development company might choose to retain some of its manufacturing
capabilities in-house or employ multiple CMOs to ensure that no single supplier gains too much
market power in the value chain. From this standpoint, Fine and Whitney developed a Make-
versus-Buy Decision Analysis Matrix that highlights how organizational dependencies and
product modularity can influence the vertical integration question from a basis of market power,
which is shown in Table 4.97
Dependent for Knowledge
and Capacity
A Potential Outsourcing Trap
Your Partners could supplant
you. They have as much or
more knowledge and can obtain
the same elements you can.
Worse Outsourcing Situation
You don't understand what you
are buying or how to integrate it.
The result could be failure since
you will spend so much time on
rework and rethinking.
Dependent for Capacity Only
Best Outsourcing Opportunity
You understand it, you can plug it
into your process or product, and it
probably can be obtained from
several sources... Buying it means
you save attention to put into areas
where you have competitive
advantage, such as integrating things.
Can Live With Outsourcing
You know how to integrate the item
so you may retain competitive
advantage even if others have access
to the same item.
Table 4: <The Matrix of Organizational Dependency and Product Decomposability>
Based on this decision matrix presented above, outsourcing production of a biologic therapeutic
such as Enbrel® is a situation that Amgen or Wyeth can live with, as long as either company is
only dependent on BIP for capacity capabilities. Given the capacity analysis in the previous
section, we find this is exactly the case. That is to say, as long as Amgen and Wyeth keep
significant manufacturing capabilities in-house for Enbrel® production, they will retain
considerable market power as an alternative manufacturer, and therefore will be able to continue
to exert their own market power when negotiating future production relationships with BIP.
Item is Modular
(Decomposable)
Item is Integral
(Not Decomposable)
5.2.4. Asset Specificity and Dependency Risk
A final market factor that impacts the vertical integration decision is that of asset specificity and
dependency risk, which helps determine if a resource currently exists in the outside market to
serve a needed capability and if a company should consider using it if it does. This factor deals
with the potential investment required for a contract manufacturer to alter its own equipment to
accommodate the needs of the product development company.
This is essentially a must for biotech drugs, as their production processes are very sensitive to
process changes, are strictly defined in their NDA product filings, and are included in regulatory
site inspections. As a result, there is a high level of physical capital specificity that a contract
manufacturer must possess to produce a biologic for a product development company, regardless
of how flexible its production platform is. In the case of biopharmaceuticals, these assets might
include perfusion equipment, specialty filtration systems, and specific chromatography systems.
Such high capital specificity often leads to a long term relationship between a CMO and a
product development company, as the product development company is unlikely to repeatedly
switch manufacturers once a relationship is formed, especially after a CMO is qualified by the
FDA or EMEA. Doing so would likely require large re-investment of capital into multiple
CMOs to achieve the required production equipment needs. Should a product development
company be unwilling to make such investments in asset specificity of its CMOs, then this
implies that it must retain or vertically integrate the production capability by continually
investing in its own equipment. Similarly a CMO would want to require some form of financial
guarantee from a product development company, before it changed its process to fit to very
specific biologic process.
In the case of the Enbrel@ supply network, it is reasonable to assume that BIP had to alter its
existing process to accommodate the Enbrel® NIS productivity improvement process in its
current contract agreement,98 given the strict regulatory requirements for qualifying a
manufacturing process. Therefore, Amgen certainly must take into account the cost of the asset
specificity of the new process for all players in the supply network, as well as take into
consideration the frequency that new process changes will be introduced that will require
successful demonstration at each site within the supply network. To that point, the frequency of
costs of these transactions is only further compounded by the fact that there are three separate
manufacturing facilities that must undergo retrofits for the new process.
Taking into account the different factors of market reliability, economies of scale, market power,
and asset specificity and dependency risks that go into making the vertical integration decision,
the Amgen Rhode Island facility might be ideally suited to be the primary source for producing
Enbrel®, but leveraging Wyeth's and or BIP's facilities for additional production capacity helps
minimize the different supply risks facing Amgen and Wyeth in meeting the world's projected
patient demand for Enbrel®.
5.3. Product, Service, and Technology Factors
Another set of factors to consider in the vertical integration decision center around product,
service, and technology factors. These factors primarily deal with how a company applies and
controls its intellectual property and technology differentiations throughout the value chain, both
of which are critical drivers in the science based industry for pharmaceuticals and
biopharmaceuticals.
5.3.1. Intellectual Property
The intellectual property surrounding a biologic product is a major concern for the biotech
industry. Failure to protect one's intellectual property could significantly lower that barrier to
entry for generic manufacturers once a patent expires, potentially resulting in the loss of billions
of dollars in future revenue streams for a product like Enbrel®. Furthermore, significant
advantage and exclusivity rights are gained by not just owning the rights to produce a
therapeutic, but also knowing how to make that therapeutic. As an example, Amgen's original
composition-of-matter patent for Epogen® actually expired in 2004, but its ability to patent the
technique to produce the protein from mammalian cells has effectively extended the franchise's
exclusivity rights in the United States until 2013. 99 Given Epogen®'s 2007 revenues of nearly
2.5 billion dollars, Amgen's ability to continually protect its intellectual property has been
critical to it remaining the largest biotechnology company by revenues. Despite the protection
offered by patents, many production processes are held as trade secrets rather than submitting
them to the public domain in the form of a patent that can be challenged.
Therefore, any pharmaceutical or biopharmaceutical company must be extremely careful in
making the decision to outsource part or all of a product manufacturing process, as this act
requires the sharing of a significant amount of the intellectual property surrounding a product
franchise. This is further complicated by the fact that many biopharmaceutical companies do not
patent their manufacturing processes, but rather keep them as internal trade secrets. Given that
exclusivity of the biologic product will someday expire, teaching a contract manufacturer a
production process could someday turn them into your own competitor.
With the entry of follow-on biologics, this issue is only further complicated, as intellectual
property from an original branded biologic could be used to make a competing product.
Returning to the Enbrel® case study, however, it is unlikely that BIP will become a follow-on
biologic producer of Enbrel®, despite it being a potential follow-on biologic blockbuster for the
CMO. This is primarily because of the market power Amgen and Wyeth currently hold as the
large biopharmaceutical companies, as BIP would likely forego any future outsourcing
opportunities with either company if it chose to act in such a way. Such an act could even
further jeopardize other contract manufacturing relationships for BIP, who is one of the largest
and most respected CMOs in the industry.
However, a smaller company might have to emphasize the intellectual property issue more, as its
market power would be more limited, as would its potential to be able to invest capital in its own
manufacturing facilities. In this scenario, a CMO may attempt to apply some of the intellectual
property gained from a small manufacturer around a manufacturing process and apply it to other
processes to improve its internal manufacturing capabilities, which may or may not be for
competing products of the original intellectual property holder. A smaller product development
company might not have the resources or the market power strength to control how its
intellectual property is handled once it is shared with a CMO. This point demonstrates how
different factors that go into making a vertical integration decision are interrelated, and how one
must truly weigh all the aspects against each other, rather than simply making the decision based
on any single factor.
5.3.2. Technology Differentiation
Technology differentiation is another important factor in the vertical integration decision. By
owning and developing manufacturing capabilities of a particular production technology, a
company can lock itself into a particular technology base. Such an investment could make it
harder to adopt newer, more productive technologies in the future, at least not without
considerable additional capital investment. By using a contract manufacturer, a company can
minimize its risk against future capital, given that the core production platform of a CMO is
likely to be shared by multiple products, many of which are from other companies. In this
scenario, engaging in an outsourcing strategy might only require the incremental additional
capital required for procuring the physical assets that are specific to one's own process.
Sizing a manufacturing facility. Given the large capital costs and long lead times associated
with building and qualifying an appropriately sized manufacturing facility, leveraging a CMO's
production capacity during a new product introduction to better understand a therapeutic's
market size can potentially save a product development company significant capital costs. Ever
since the original Enbrel@ shortfall of the market, product development companies frequently
oversize their production facilities to ensure that they do not short the market and risk losing
market share to other competitors. Given the complexities of sizing the market size of a new
product introduction and the propensity to over-estimate future sales, these companies often find
themselves with factories with significant excess capacity, which leads to their inefficient
operations of their factories. This result should not be surprising though, as the strategic goal of
product development companies' manufacturing division is to ensure supply, which would lead
one to expect some buffer capacity to be able to meet surges in demand.
Production Knowledge and Power. Once again though, a company that completely relies on a
contract manufacturer to develop new production technologies for its manufacturing processes
might find itself losing market power over its respective CMO. Although product development
companies initially focus their R&D budgets towards lead target identification and optimization,
failure to improve manufacturing capabilities as well will eventually lead to a heavy dependence
on CMOs. Therefore, a company that leverages a CMO during a new product introduction
should still eventually invest in its own manufacturing capabilities when the market is better
understood. Similarly, a company that continually switches between outsourcing and in-
sourcing products is also likely to undergo numerous challenges and be incapable of adopting the
proper technologies or leveraging them properly.
Technology differentiation might not initially seem to be a problem in the Enbrel@ case study,
but it is truly a crucial factor in the long-term evaluation of the Rhode Island site. The traditional
product development company typically wishes to outsource a product that is about to lose its
patent and replace it with a newer product from its pipeline, given the expected loss of market
share from generics. In this way, not only does a product development company keep its newest
intellectual property in-house, but one also assumes that it continues earning higher margins on
the branded patent protected therapeutic. 100 Even by the time Enbrel@'s patent expires, follow-
on biologics will likely not receive the same speed and depth of penetration of the market as
traditional generics, so this strategy should be revisited before finalizing any sourcing decisions.
However, given the sheer size of the Amgen Rhode Island 20,000 L bioreactors and the on-going
productivity improvements that are producing new products with higher titer manufacturing
processes, finding a single pipeline product to take over the full ARI capacity is a challenging
prospect, especially given the uncertainty of the drug development process of candidates in
Amgen's pipeline That is, ARI's own technology differentiation makes it difficult to outsource
Enbrel®, given the manufacturing capacity located there, as there is limited opportunity to
rationalize that site's capacity using other potential candidates for manufacturing. As a result,
ARI's long-term strategy after Enbrel® will likely need to entail becoming a multi-product
facility, just to be able to fully utilize its existing capacity. On the other hand, if follow-on
biologics do not greatly impact the unit market share or gross margins of Enbrel®, Amgen can
reasonably consider producing Enbrel® at ARI for a long time after the patent expires, as its
economies of scale and production capacity are likely to rival any follow-on biologics
competitors.
Product, service, and technology factors surrounding outsourcing in the biotechnology sector are
perhaps the most difficult to answer as any of the other three primary factors: strategic, market,
and economic. Intellectual property and technology differentiation are core features to the
success and sustainability of any pharmaceutical or biotechnology company, and as such, should
be carefully reviewed when entering a new relationship with a contract manufacturer.
Leveraging a CMO can provide immediate and cheap access to capabilities and capacity that is
unavailable to a product development company, but the wrong relationship can also expose a
company's trade secrets and intellectual property, destroying potentially billions of dollars in
future revenues.
5.4. Economic Factors
Finally, economic factors play an obvious role in a company's decision to vertically integrate.
These factors most directly affect the capital investments and total operating costs that are visible
to both the public and a company's executive board.
5.4.1. Investment Costs
The investment costs involved in vertical integration cover a wide range of possibilities. The
decision to acquire or develop a capability or technology must consider the short and long-term
costs of that decision. Keeping up with the latest production technologies, such as switching
from roller bottle technologies, to high volume, low titer production processes, to low volume,
high titer processes can put significant capital investment pressures on a product development
company, such as Amgen. These investment costs go beyond just capital costs, and include
human capital costs, utility costs, system development costs, and inventory costs of operating
different manufacturing sites that might operate under different technologies.
As previously discussed, the investment costs to bring a therapeutic to market are substantial.
Beyond the estimated capitalized cost of 1.24 billion dollars to navigate a biologic through the
drug development process, 1"1 a vertically integrated manufacturing division still has sizeable
remaining capital costs associated with building a biologic manufacturing facility. This expense
can typically run an additional 200 to 400 million dollars, which is up to five times that of a
traditional chemical plant. 102 Furthermore, since biologic regulatory approval typically covers
both the therapeutic and manufacturing facility, this expense usually must be paid concurrently
with Phase III clinical studies, which is before the therapeutic has actually received regulatory
approval or the market size of the therapeutic is well defined.
For a blockbuster therapeutic, this expense can be even higher. Back in 2002, Amgen invested
$500 million into the renovation of the 250,000 square-foot BioNow facility for Enbrel® and
then immediately proceeded to invest further in the newer 500,000 square-foot BioNext facility
at Rhode Island for expanded Enbrel@ production. 10 3' 1'04 Yet today, with the Enbrel@ NIS
productivity improvement being implemented and Amgen's recent financial crunch, the BioNow
facility had to be shutdown and a number of its associated employees laid-off as part of Amgen's
on-going cost cutting efforts. Although this outcome could not have been foreseen at the time,
this example shows how the decision to invest in vertical integration carries the burden of a wide
range of investment costs that must be considered.
5.4.2. Design, Production, and Delivery Costs
Comparing the operational costs of production between different facilities is a difficult task, as it
often requires comparing data derived from different financial accounting systems versus true
economic costs. Items such as direct labor and material are typically unique costs involved in
the production of a therapeutic that can be easily assigned, allowing a company with greater
economies of scale, buying power, or geographically lower wages to earn a competitive
advantage. Yet other indirect costs, such as corporate overhead, are not as easily determined for
a product, as these are typically joint costs associated with activities that do not directly benefit a
product, but have some arbitrary allocating financial driver to assign them to a product. As we
will see in the next chapter, such financial difficulties make comparing sites within the Enbrel®
supply network extremely difficult, as overhead costs can be used to inflate or deflate the
calculations involved in determining the standard cost of producing a therapeutic.
Another production cost that is difficult to quantify are the increased or decreased transaction
costs associated with managing an outsourced supplier versus in-house production. In
determining the answer to whether a firm should manufacture a biologic therapeutic in-house or
outsource it, one should take into account the increased transaction costs and the labor required
to create, manage, and execute the new contract agreements made to a CMO. As a result, the
decision to dis-integrate an integrated manufacturing capability or site function does not save the
full labor attached to the capability or site, as there will be some corresponding increase in labor
within the product development company required to monitor the contract manufacturing
organization as well. Accounting for such cross-functional or cross-divisional changes in one's
operating strategy proves to be a very difficult allocation to resolve.
Geographic considerations also need to be taken into account when determining where to build a
new manufacturing facility or what CMO to partner with, as factor costs associated with labor,
energy, and taxes are likely to vary significantly by region. As a result, the decision to vertically
integrate or outsource therapeutic production can rapidly change based on changing economic
incentives from political governments. For example, India and China have proven to be able to
provide considerable capital and labor savings for manufacturing facilities, but their adoption in
the pharmaceutical and biotech industries has been slow, based on the technical knowledge
required to produce a biologic and the concern surrounding intellectual property rights in these
countries. As these concerns are addressed over time though, it is likely these markets will
develop into economically efficient manufacturing centers in the industry.
Taking into account the investment, design, production, and delivery costs when determining the
answer to the vertical integration question requires fairly in depth analysis. As a result, the next
chapter will discuss the creation of an economic model to aide in balancing the different
economic trade-offs of these different costs.
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6. Modeling Economic Sourcing Strategies in the Enbrel@ Supply Network
Once again, in order to protect proprietary Amgen information, the data presented throughout
this thesis has been altered and does not represent the actual values used by Amgen, Inc. The
model inputs, dollar values, and other proprietary information have been disguised and altered in
order to protect competitive information where necessary.
Although there are numerous factors that influence one's choice to vertically integrate or not, in
the end, an economic analysis is required to determine the financial feasibility and outcomes. In
this chapter, the author discusses the formulation of a sourcing model, further examines the
limitations involved in using financial accounting data, and suggests end strategies that can be
pulled from these outputs.
6.1. Accounting Limitations Within the Production Network
As stated earlier, using financial accounting numbers to create an economic sourcing model is a
difficult task. Given that there are different financial accounting systems being employed
throughout the Enbrel® manufacturing network, directly comparing different operating costs that
account for assorted cost allocations of overhead and other expenses might not yield
economically valid results, but still provides strategic insight to the potential sourcing outcomes
of different scenarios. The basis of cost accounting differences is one of the reasons why a
company should not just simply answer the vertical integration question through the result of any
single factor or economic analysis, but through the whole employment of the framework
provided in this thesis.
Looking more closely at the financial accounting differences within the Enbrel® manufacturing
network, one finds that directly comparing Amgen's and BIP's financial operating costs is not as
large an issue as when Wyeth is included in the model. After the shutdown of the BioNow
facility, the Amgen Rhode Island site is currently only producing a single product out of a single
facility, allowing for most of the site costs to be directly allocated to the product. Some
corporate allocation of overhead is included in the ARI product costs, but this still creates a
smaller overhead bias than if the site was a multi-product facility.
On the other hand, BIP's marginal costs basis was essentially handled as a flat production fee for
each batch it produces, with additional allowances for increased productivity for year-on-year
improvement. 10 5 There is some additional variable Amgen management costs associated with
managing higher or lower production volumes from the CMO, but these were handled as part of
the labor modeling done later in this chapter. For the purpose of the model, knowing BIP's true
underlying cost structure is not necessary, as the marginal cost of production to Amgen and
Wyeth is essentially based on this flat fee.
The true challenge in defining the basis for the economic sourcing model is rooted in
determining Wyeth's costs of manufacturing from its accounting numbers, as the Grange Castle
site is a large multiple product site that likely uses a different financial allocation system than
Amgen does. As a result, Wyeth-produced Enbrel@ BDS has both corporate and site overhead
allocated to its operating costs, which their cost accountants may be incentivized to put on this
product, since the global manufacturing costs are partially shared with Amgen. Given the
potential for Wyeth's cost accounting information to vary significantly from Amgen's cost
accounting data, determining economic opportunity costs between the two presents a significant
challenge in creating a sourcing model.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the financial numbers presented in the sourcing model for
Wyeth's production costs are estimates based on limited available data. As a result, trying to
directly compare costs between the two companies is not easy nor is it likely valid given the
scarcity of input data. Should Amgen continue to develop this sourcing model, additional
resources should be applied to better determine these costs. Despite these limitations, including
Wyeth in the economic modeling of the Enbrel® supply network does allow us to gain insights
to the overall system's world demand and the outputs must be analyzed in conjunction with
using the full strategic approach presented in the previous chapters.
6.2. Determining the Basis of the Sourcing Optimization
Pharmaceutical and biopharmaceuticals typically operate under economic monopoly principles,
based on the protections afforded to them by patents and other high barriers to entry. The theory
behind monopoly economic sourcing in a multi-plant network is not a complex derivation, and is
typically included in most core graduate economics classes. Assuming that a monopoly firm
wishes to maximize its profits, it simply sets its production level such that its marginal revenues
equal its marginal costs. In the case that there is more than one facility involved, profit is
maximized by choosing output levels so that the marginal revenue, which depends on the total
output, equals the marginal costs of each plant. 10 6
Although this simple example is useful for framing a monopolist's view for production, it has
numerous limitations when applied to the Enbrel® case study. Since the bulk drug substance
produced is merely an intermediate, it still must undergo final filling and formulation at another
facility prior to its sale on the open market. A transfer price is associated with this transaction,
but this does not represent a true economic revenue stream, as it is governed once again by cost
accounting practices. In theory, the optimal economic internal transfer price should be based
strictly on the marginal cost of the product, but accounting systems may apply different
standards based on creating cost control and accounting incentives to manufacturing facilities.
Regardless of which method Amgen uses for transfer pricing, attempting to maximize profits for
using such a number will not provide a meaningful economic result in this case, since setting
marginal revenue to marginal costs either involves using arbitrary cost accounting transfer prices
or creates theoretical values where the two variables are defined as equal for all production
output levels.
Another limitation of the monopolist's production model stems from the ethical hazard of a
pharmaceutical or biopharmaceutical firm producing an output that purely maximizes profit.
Although pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies charge large margins on their
products to justify their risk of capital, they still have an ethical obligation to deliver life altering
medications to patients, even in cases where the patient cannot afford them. Amgen's
manufacturing mission of "Every Patient, Every Time" solidifies Amgen's commitment to make
its products available to any patient that needs them, despite the economic profit limitations
associated with providing such product availability. Therefore an economic model that attempts
to solve the manufacturing sourcing needs based purely on maximizing the profits will likely
provide results far from the current market equilibrium.
As a result of the limitations of the monopolist's model, a discrete non-linear sourcing model
was created for the Enbrel® production network that minimized the total production cost through
scheduling batch starts as the model's decision variables at a given facility in the network, while
meeting the projected market demand. Batch starts of each manufacturing site within the supply
network for a given year were used as the decision variables for the model to take into account
improving year-on-year success rates and the manufacturing capacity of each site. The model
assumed that all fixed costs associated with each production facility were unavoidable costs to
simplify the modeling process. That is, the model did not take into account the long-run
possibility of selling a facility or the cancelling the BIP's contract should it not be economically
utilized in the optimization. There are complex costs associated with either of these options,
which are overly difficult and too subjective to model, which is why they were left out of the
initial model analysis.
6.3. The Impact of Run-rate to Labor Needs
In view of the fact that the decision variables for the sourcing model are tied to scheduling
batches over the course of the year, it is necessary to be able to extrapolate financial operating
costs from this manipulated variable. Since the scheduled batches per year can easily be
converted to a run-rate basis, where run-rate is the time in days between batch starts, this created
the foundation for the framing of the rest of Amgen's accounting cost data. This manipulated
variable basis was particularly practical, given that there was significant Amgen historical
financial and operating data to leverage, based on the continued run-rate ramp-up of Enbrel@ in
the BioNext facility over the last couple of years to meet expanding demand.
Given the rigid process requirements surrounding the production of biologics, direct labor
modeling is a fairly straightforward process and easy to scale based on run-rate. During the
internship, multiple labor models were created for the original Enbrel® process, the new
Enbrel® NIS process, and other potential new product introductions for both production factories
at Rhode Island. This labor modeling was completed as part of the original internship proposal
to aide in balancing site labor requirements between producing Enbrel@ in the BioNext facility
and potential pipeline products in a retrofitted BioNow facility. Unfortunately, the resulting
financial issues involved with Amgen's anemia franchise led to the capital for the potential
retrofit project being canceled. Although these models did not achieve their intended original
goal of helping the ARI site become a multi-product site, these models were instrumental in the
creation of the economic sourcing model.
Seeing that the production process for a biologic is fairly rigid and inflexible based on regulatory
filing requirements, an overall Enbrel® NIS "batch recipe" was created to schedule the daily
labor needs over the two month production process for each of the major manufacturing
functional areas; Media Preparation, Cell Culture, Buffer Preparation, and Purification. Once a
master labor "batch recipe" was created, it was able to be reiterated and overlaid on itself with an
inputted offset to predict the cumulative operator requirements, where the offset represented an
assumed run-rate. The resulting data could then be used to make charts such as Figure 11, which
shows the daily labor needs for a campaign start-up or steady state operation at a given run-rate.
The final output labor levels included operator utilization rate assumptions, based on operator
needs for lunch, breaks, and other administrative duties, such as training and completing
manufacturing investigations.
Figure 11: <Daily Labor Requirements for a Campaign Start-up>1
As with any model, the labor model results were verified by previous front line supervisors with
significant production experience to determine model compliance with actual staffing needs,
which proved to be fairly accurate in providing cumulative labor requirements for a particular
run-rate, as shown in Figure 12. The predicted labor outputs were viewed as theoretical
operational minimums, and where large discrepancies were noted, they were documented as
potential future work redesigns. When the staffing model was incorporated into the sourcing
model, these discrepancies were then minimized as much as possible through model parameter
manipulations, until the accuracy of the model predicted levels that were in alignment to the
current staffing practices.
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Figure 12: <Operator Shift Requirements for a Given Run-Rate>"'
6.4. Other Constraints and Inputs to the Sourcing Model
Optimization Parameter. In order to create a structural framework that could manipulate the
decision variables to reach a feasible solution, the existing sourcing model was designed to
balance world Enbrel® supply and demand within a given tolerance, based on the fact that the
model could only schedule whole, discrete batches. This design ensured the output minimized
the true economic costs within the given tolerance, rather than scheduling batches in an attempt
to merely meet a distinct demand output.
Sourcing Parameters. Amgen's long-range marketing plans for Enbrel® were then adapted for
the purposes of modeling the lower limit of the supply constraint for sourcing model. Since
current demand forecasts did not exceed a time horizon beyond Enbrel®'s composition of matter
patent expiration, a worse-case market demand drop off 30% was assumed when the patent
expires at the end of 2012, due to the market penetration of follow-on biologics. As discussed
earlier in Chapter 4, this drop off in demand is unlikely, as even traditional generics did not see
this type of unit share market loss immediately after patent loss, as the market took many years
to accept interchangeability of these products with the original branded drug. Given the
increased interchangeability issues and other market forces surrounding follow-on biologics
.' Data masked to protect proprietary information
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introduction to the market, the author expects that the rate and penetration of these products into
the branded biologics market will be slower and smaller than it was for traditional generics.
The model's over-production limit that set the upper yearly production limit was allowed to vary
by as much as five percent from the lower yearly demand limit, which was subjectively selected
based on the algorithm's computing complexity and average time to solve the optimization.
Since the sourcing model was driven on the basis of minimizing costs, the upper limit of the
supply constraint was an unbounded constraint in the analysis. Therefore, reducing this
constraint value merely extended computational complexity of the problem being solved, given
that the model made assumptions for time value of money variables such as inflation and the cost
of capital that were also incorporated into the solution of the discrete, non-linear optimization.
As for the other production constraints, each site facility's maximum capacity was used based
upon available data as a year-on-year production constraint, which included site tendencies for
scheduled maintenance shutdowns. In addition, due to contractual obligations currently held
with BIP, certain minimal levels of production were added for the BIP facility as additional
yearly constraints. 107' 1 08 Finally, an assumed world safety stock of Enbrel® BDS was set to 12
months on-hand. This is based on production start to release cycle times of biopharmaceuticals
being extremely variable and long. Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology tend towards keeping
large safety stocks when compared to other industries, since the potential downfalls of shorting
the market can result in substantial economic losses for a product franchise in a developed
market segment.
No other linear or non-linear production capacity constraints were included in the sourcing
model, although other indirect batch assumptions were made for each facility, which included
expected kilograms batch output, year-on-year productivity improvements, and successful batch
success rates that were based on historical Enbrel@ data and applied to the Enbrel® NIS
production process.
For a given expected number of yearly batch starts for a facility, the sourcing model was capable
of using a series of calculations to determine each facility's yearly production output and
respective operational costs. This was done by converting the projected yearly batch starts into a
run-rate, which was then used as an input to the previously designed staffing models to project
the required direct labor needs for that given run-rate. The original staffing model was originally
made to calculate direct labor staffing levels though, so additional modifications and
assumptions were made to accommodate expected changes to overhead and indirect staffing
requirements based on run-rate. For example, the head count of different functional areas will
vary differently as a function to run-rate, which is once again, the number of days between batch
starts. Based on a postulated number of batch starts, the site headcount could be projected and
used to extrapolate the total yearly direct labor, indirect labor, and overhead costs from historical
accounting information.
Since some of the financial data consisted of fixed and variable costs, the Amgen Variable Cost
Productivity (VCP) tool was adapted and applied within the model to appropriately sweep and
modify fixed costs and variables costs. The VCP tool was originally drafted as a joint effort by
all the Amgen LFM interns. The purpose of this tool is designed to be a corporate metric that
could be used to compare different Amgen facilities' year-on-year productivity improvements, so
that factors such as product mix and run-rate did not impact the metrics rating, based on the
previously discussed cost accounting concerns. The VCP metric involved defining variable and
fixed cost accounts for the standard corporate financial reporting system, and was therefore
easily incorporated and then applied to the sourcing model. For more details of the VCP Metric,
reference Adam Villa's 2008 LFM thesis entitled Lean Transformation Methodology and
Implementation in Biopharmaceutical Operations.109
Similar financial information was collected and estimated based on Wyeth's assumed production
costs in Grange Castle, Ireland. The Wyeth site is a multi-product facility, so even if more
accurate financial data was available directly from Wyeth, one would still have difficulties
making direct comparisons between Amgen's and Wyeth's costs, as separating the differences
between Amgen's and Wyeth's financial accounting costs from the true economic costs would
prove extremely difficult. However, even though Wyeth's cost structure was estimated, it was
included in the analysis so that the sourcing model could take into account the world capacity for
Enbrel®.
The final model was formulated by minimizing the total production cost of the manufacturing
network through manipulating the number of batch starts at each facility. Batch starts were used
as the decision variable, since an overall batch completion success rate was included in the
model. Given the high complexity of the model, a Premium Solver Excel add-in from Frontline
Solvers was used to solve for the optimal sourcing configuration given the specified discrete,
non-linear constraints of the model. A high level printout of the model is included in the
Appendix, although the specific workings and supporting financial inputs of the model are not
included for proprietary reasons. As noted at the beginning of this document, all the data has
been masked and manipulated as to not reveal information that could be used as a competitive
advantage against the companies in the Enbrel® manufacturing network.
6.5. The Theoretical Sourcing Optimum with Multiple Production Facilities
A snapshot of the model's optimized economic sourcing solution is shown in Table 5,i" which
highlights the model's optimized sourcing of batch starts for each facility to meet the projected
yearly demand. An important take-away from the solution is the order of preference in sourcing
material, which is Amgen's Rhode Island facility, then the contract manufacturer BIP, based on
the contractual minimum requirements of their supply agreement. Although economic
comparisons across all three companies might not be economically accurate due to financial
accounting issues and limited data surrounding Wyeth's production costs, there is sufficient data
available in this example to compare Rhode Island's costs to the contract manufacturers. This
result is important in that Rhode Island has historically received criticism concerning its ability
to compete competitively with other organizations based on total manufacturing costs. Although
future manufacturing innovations from any of the facilities can significantly alter the model
results, it provided some reassurance that the ARI facility is currently a competitive sourcing
option against a contract manufacturer.
" Data masked to protect proprietary information
Decision Variables Scheduled Yearly Production Batches Starts (Percent of maximum)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
BIP 40 40 33 28 23 0 0
Amgen 83 80 92 88 100 50 75
Wyeth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5: <Sourcing Models Optimal Scheduling of Batches by Facility>
A closer look at the model's data reveals a potential reason for Amgen Rhode Island's common
misconception of their standard costs. Anytime ARI costs were compared to its competitors, it
was done on the basis of their total average cost. As can be seen in Table 6, v ARI's average cost
is consistently higher than BIP's. In fact, Wyeth's costs are also projected to be less on a
marginal basis, as it is only BIP's minimum batches constraint that is forcing the model to use
them as a manufacturing source. Yet many of these costs are fixed or non-cash cost transactions,
such as fixed overhead and depreciation, which do not affect the marginal cost decision of where
to produce the next batch. Looking closer at Amgen's marginal costs, it becomes more apparent
as to why ARI is the preferred sourcing agent based on its current superior marginal costs.
Given the size and capacity of the ARI facility, this result should not be that surprising, as ARI
should benefit from higher economies of scale at higher production volumes, assuming it is
being run efficiently and effectively.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Average BIP Cost 53.78 55.24 56.82 58.45 60.12 61.85 63.63Cost Amgen Cost 65.88 71.88 61.51 67.36 61.29 100.00 77.84(Percent of maximum) Wyeth Cost
BIP MCost 53.70 55.24 56.82 58.45 60.12 61.55 63.63Mcost(% AC Cost) Amgen MCost 36.15 40.01 34.57 38.31 35.10 49.27 42.84
Wyeth MCost 48.32 48.40 49.94 51.42 51.60 53.11 54.51
Table 6: <Comparison of Total Average Costs Versus Marginal Costs by Facility and Year>
Another important output from the model involved the capacity scheduling for the three plants.
Through manual manipulation, it was determined what facility combinations were capable of
meeting the world demand, both now and in the future. Given the current expected batch
productivity, Amgen Rhode Island is currently a critical component to the long-term Enbrel®
v Data masked to protect proprietary information
supply strategy through at least 2012, as Wyeth and BIP would be unable to supply the world
market on their own given the current model's assumptions. Similarly, ARI is the only site that
has the capacity to supply the world market as the sole supplier after the original Enbrel@ patent
expires at the end of 2012, after the unit market share is assumed to diminish by 30% because of
the entrance of follow-on biologics. Future productivity improvements could easily change the
capacity profile of all facilities, so the site should not become complacent. However, the model
results should reinforce that the site is a key player in Amgen's and Wyeth's need to continue
supplying Enbrel@ to the market.
6.6. Building a Strategy from the Sourcing Model Outputs
The economic model provides us with some interesting insights, but once again, this is only a
single dimension that we should use in evaluating what level of vertical integration should be
applied to the Enbrel@ supply network from Amgen's perspective. The remainder of this section
discusses some possibilities of how the different key stakeholders might react to the information
afforded by both the sourcing model and the framework provided in the previous chapter.
6.6.1. Product Development Companies' Perspective
Amgen and Wyeth are both product innovator companies who are strategically focused on
ensuring therapeutic supply to their patients, whereas a contract manufacturer is focused more on
filling their capacity than fulfilling the end patient's needs. Therefore, the fact that the sourcing
model eliminated Wyeth as a sourcing facility does not immediately lend itself to the elimination
of Wyeth from the supply network, especially since it is the preferred second manufacturing
source. Wyeth will likely be unwilling to relinquish complete control of the manufacturing
supply chain to Amgen or BIP on the basis of market power positioning. Furthermore, the best
way for Wyeth or Amgen to ensure therapeutic supply is to own the section of the value chain
associated with its production. This will be especially true if there is large post-patent revenue
potential of Enbrel®, as they would become too dependent on others for their full production
needs.
Another reason for Wyeth to potentially stay involved in the Enbrel@ supply chain is the fact
that Wyeth's Grange Castle facility is a multi-product site, providing it little opportunity to sell
the facility or equipment used for Enbrel® BDS production without disrupting the other
production processes at the Grange Castle site as well. So although it has a product development
mentality, it too will want to keep its active capital utilized making Enbrel@ or another
therapeutic when possible. As a result, the final sourcing strategy needs be consistent with not
only Amgen's long-term goals, but also account for Wyeth's long-term goals.
Conversely, if Amgen or Wyeth receives regulatory approval for a new therapeutic that closely
fits the capacity and platform of their respective Enbrel@ production facilities, either might be
more willing to allow the other or BIP to fulfill their Enbrel® production needs. Since ARI is a
critical sourcing site for Enbrel@ until there is significant unit market share loss, introducing a
new product that takes up a significant amount of the site's production capacity might be
difficult, if Wyeth or BIP exits the supply network. However, given the size and capacity of the
ARI facility, it will likely need to eventually convert to a multi-product facility to strengthen its
own long-term outlook. So there is certainly potential of producing a new product and Enbrel@
concurrently at ARI should the right product come out of the pipeline at the right time. Although
the model doesn't account for such scenario, it would provide ARI with the best long-term site
viability, especially given the uncertainty surrounding what impact follow-on biologics will
have.
Finally, despite ARI being the model's current preferred supplier for producing Enbrel® BDS,
the site should continue to aggressively work to reduce its operational costs through programs
such as Amgen's operational excellence and lean efforts. Today's biopharmaceutical business
environment is very dynamic, and failure to continually improve on one's own operations will
certainly lead to becoming an obsolete facility in the supply network.
6.6.2. Contract Manufacturer's Perspective
BIP, who currently holds a long-term production contract, 110,111 also has cause for concern. If
Wyeth and Amgen both position themselves to be Enbrel® producers after the patent expires,
BIP would be left having its production quantities diminished until its contract expires or is
canceled, creating the potential for idle capacity within BIP. Given BIP's strategic focus on
filling idle capacity, it is likely to be aggressive in finding both near and long-term replacements
for such an idling capacity scenario.
Given BIP's incentives though, it is not as concerned about producing Enbrel®, but producing
any therapeutic that fills its current capacity. Therefore, there is potential that Wyeth and Amgen
could negotiate across different product lines to replace Enbrel@ production with another
product. Should such a compromise exist, all three companies might be able to benefit, creating
a solution that would allow a greater leveraging of all three companies' supply chain networks.
An example of such a product could be Amgen's current Phase III product, denosumab. 112 The
therapeutic is expected to be a very successful product, but the overall demand is still highly
uncertain, which makes investing in building and sizing an internal production capacity
extremely challenging. By being able to outsource a portion of the initial production volume to
BIP, Amgen could maximize its short term capital investments, while also being able to smooth
the production demand needs until the overall market for denosumab is better determined.
Although this potentially outsources a product with newer intellectual property, Amgen has a
long standing relationship with BIP, which helps mitigate this risk. Given Amgen's recent
financial difficulties, such a scenario could be in its best long-term interests and allow it to
continue growing revenues at a reduced cost.
7. Conclusion, Recommendations, and Future Activities
7.1. Conclusion
This thesis developed a methodology and framework for examining both the qualitative and
quantitative factors that goes into a biotechnology company's decision as to how it should
vertically integrate or outsource the manufacturing functions within its value chain. Applying
this framework to the Enbrel@ supply network, it has been shown that leveraging both internal
and external capabilities can yield numerous operational and strategic benefits to product
development companies. This is not to say that this is the ultimate answer for all biotech
companies in all situations, as the framework provided here must be applied to each situation in
its entirety and revisited often to ensure that market conditions have not changed to ensure
optimal performance. As even in the case of the Enbrel® supply network, a productivity
improvement and the emergence of follow-on biologics suggest the need for change from the
current sourcing model.
7.2. Sourcing Strategies Surrounding Optimizing the Enbrel@ Supply Network
The implementation of the NIS Enbrel® process creates excess capacity in the current supply
network, because of the productivity improvement associated with the change. When this fact is
combined with the future potential long-term demand drop associated with the patent expiration
of Enbrel@ at the end of 2012, the current supply network of three production facilities is simply
not optimal for either short or long-term production planning, as continuing to use the supply
chain network in its current form could potentially be costing hundreds of millions of dollars a
year in opportunity costs. As a result, many of the factors that went into reaching the current
structure of the supply network need to be revisited and re-evaluated. Based on the framework
provided in this thesis, the Amgen Rhode Island facility is positioned to be a long-term producer
of Enbrel@, but only Amgen can determine if this is aligned with its own long-term strategic
goals.
Given that Amgen's and Wyeth's strategic goals and investments are similar, they would be wise
to work together to find a solution that optimizes and satisfies all current members of the
Enbrel® supply chain network. The leveraging of a contract manufacturer to mitigate many of
the market risks associated with developing and manufacturing biologics has provided proven
benefits, and it is a production model that should continue to be fostered. In the case of Enbrel®
production, the final solution will likely be a paradigm shift from the current supply network, but
there is no reason that the relationships formed by this network alliance cannot be extended
across other franchises and activities.
7.3. Moving Away from the Past, Focusing on True Costs
From the research provided in this thesis, Amgen has important competitive advantages it must
defend. The primary advantage is the potential of the Amgen Rhode Island facility being the
preferred producer within the Enbrel® supply network, as highlighted by the sourcing
framework and economic model provided in this thesis. The analysis is not dynamic though, and
costs of production are increasingly becoming a critical economic factor. Amgen is actively
engaging in continuous improvements programs through such activities as operational excellence
and lean programs that will continue to drive its product costs down. This is not only important
to keep its cost advantages within the supply network, but is the primary driver in relieving cost
pressures from the government and the consolidating insurance benefit managers to aid in
keeping healthcare's costs down.
7.4. Follow-on Biologics
It is the opinion of the author that follow-on biologics are needed to keep driving therapeutic
innovations, as increased competition provides a very real and tangible incentive for product
development companies to produce new novel medicines. The author does not mean to suggest
that biologic product development companies are not trying to discover new therapeutics, as they
have some of the smartest researchers in the industry searching for rare and life threatening
diseases, but the threat of competition creates a sense of urgency that provides additional
incentive to find the next therapeutic to sustain growth. This proposition was reflected in the
pharmaceutical industry, when the industry experienced a sharp increase in R & D investments
in response to the Hatch-Waxman Act during the late 1980s." 13 In this way, competition
provides patients with increased potential for new novel medications.
Even though follow-on biologics will likely not provide immediate pricing relief given the
expected market dynamics surrounding follow-on biologic's interchangeability concerns, their
long-term benefits are still undeniable. With government healthcare costs increasing at a rate of
about eight percent a year, which exceeds the inflation rate and the growth of the current
economy, follow-on biologics can provide a mechanism for some cost relief.114 This process will
take time to be accepted, but the sooner follow-on biologics are allowed into the market, the
sooner the benefits of price competition can be realized.
The United States has already fallen behind the European Union in creating legislation that
allows follow-on biologics a pathway to the market, and is likely still at least two years away
before legislation is passed by Congress and the FDA institutes the changes necessary to create
an abbreviated application process for follow-on biologics. That said, the government still has
the obligation to its citizens to ensure all medications are safe and effective, which in this case
should require some additional level of comparability and safety testing prior to marketing
approval that is consistent with that which is already done today for biologic process changes.
Amgen admittedly does not have direct influence over this process, but it has significant
responsibilities and presence as a biotechnology pioneer and market leader to ensure that the end
legislation benefits and protects the patients that it serves, so that the right therapeutic continues
to reach every patient, every time.
7.5. Future Work
The economic sourcing model presented in this thesis has its limitations. Financial data from
Wyeth was an estimate based on limited data. Should Amgen choose to expand this model for
its continued strategic planning, improving this input would only serve to help Amgen better
understand how product costs should be influencing its sourcing strategies. Furthermore, the
sourcing strategy employed in this thesis only dealt with the bulk drug substance for Enbrel®,
which might only provide a local optimum to the overall Enbrel® supply network. Expanding
this analysis to the entire manufacturing supply chain would provide further enhancements that
greatly benefit the members of the Enbrel®'s supply network.
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Production Methods Confidentially Withheld
Current
Inventory 82.44 86.46 91.08 95.87 100.00 70.59 73.74
Target Inventory 82.27 86.38 90.70 95.24 100.00 70.00 73.50
BIP
Run Rate Amgen 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.2 2.1
Wyeth
Headcount ARI 1210 1269 1267 1320 1315 997 1237
BIP 0.8 0.9 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Success Rate Amgen 0.85 0.85 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.95 0.95
Wyeth 0.85 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.9 0.9 0.9
BIP
Yield Amgen Methods Confidentially Withheld
Wyeth
BIP 32 36 31 27 22 0 0
Successful Lots Amgen 71 68 83 79 90 48 71
Wyeth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BIP
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Wyeth
Average Cost BIP Cost 53.78 55.24 56.82 58.45 60.12 61.85 63.63(Percent of Amgen Cost 65.88 71.88 61.51 67.36 61.29 100.00 77.84
maximum) Wyeth Cost
Mcost BIP MCost 53.70 55.24 56.82 58.45 60.12 61.55 63.63
(% AC Cost) Amgen MCost 36.15 40.01 34.57 38.31 35.10 49.27 42.84
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0 2008 Supply 82.44 => 82.27
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'x Data masked to protect proprietary information
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